[1]**WORKING PAPER**

Who Prefers Algorithmic Filtering of Political News?

Examining Individual and Partisan Susceptibility to News Personalization

AEJMC 2020 submission

Author: Chau Tong (cttong@wisc.edu)

Abstract

Political communication scholars often express concerns about the implications of algorithmic news recommendations in online news consumption. This study extends current literature on users' attitudes towards journalistic and algorithmic news curation (e.g. Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018; Thurman, Moeller, Helberger & Trilling, 2019) to examine who is more likely to prefer algorithmically selected political news, and whether partisans in the US with these tendencies are more susceptible to "filter bubble" effects. This study examines attitudinal correlates of approval of political news curation performed by journalists or algorithms using survey data from American Internet users (N= 2,018). Results show that **online source diversity** and **social media trust** have the **strongest positive effects** on approval of journalistic curation, and approval of algorithmic selection based on personal behavior and social recommendation. **Populist attitudes**, intriguingly, is **strongly associated** with **approval of algorithmic curation,** whereas **"algorithmic awareness" seems to make people less comfortable with automatic selection of political news on the basis of what their friends have consumed**. Approval of **algorithmic selection** is particularly **higher** for **Republicans with selective exposure tendency, and lower for Democrats with extreme opinions on climate change**.

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There is, however, no relationship between approval of automated political news selection and the **likelihood to be in echo chambers** for both sides.

Keywords: news selection, algorithmic curation, selective exposure, echo chamber, filter bubbles, news media trust, social media trust.

Introduction

Together with the rise of digital information, individuals, algorithms and platforms have risen to be prominent contemporary gatekeepers in the selection and dissemination of online news (Wallace, 2018).

According to the Digital News Report 2017, more than half of news users globally (54%) prefer algorithmic forms of news presentation (i.e., search engines, social media, and aggregators) as compared to those handled by journalists (i.e., via news site/app, email, and mobile notifications), and that preference is stronger for those who mainly use smartphones (58%) and are younger (64%) (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy & Nielsen, 2017). The current information environment is one in which the traditional gatekeeping roles of media professionals and journalists are shared with these news actors, and editorial selection is subjected to further selection by the algorithms in search engines, social media, and news aggregators (Fletcher & Nielse, 2019).

Research into user attitudes towards news personalization show that users in general are willing to embrace news personalization (Thurman et al., 2018) as long as it does not interfere with the diversity and depth of news (Bodo et al., 2019). Analyzing survey data in 26 countries, Thurman et al. (2018) found that preference for algorithmic over human-selected news is determined by multiple factors, including media trust, privacy concerns, preference to consume social media news. Fletcher and Nielsen (2016, 2018) focused on how users are exposed to

journalistic content through social media and illustrated how contemporary Internet users are more informed about online news and more critical towards algorithmic news selection. They refer to this public sentiment as "generalized skepticism" in which individuals express doubts and skepticism about all sorts of information online (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2019). In this study, it was found that approval for algorithmic selection based on personal behavior is on average higher than approval for editorial selection, and the latter is in turn higher than approval for algorithmic selection based on social recommendations. Interestingly, approval for online selection based on social recommendations is positively associated with interest in soft news, and negatively associated with interest in hard news, indicating that individual news consumption and characteristics matter in these relationships.

This study builds on and extends this line of research in examining users' news habits, perceptions and attitudes regarding news personalization. In particular, this study distinguishes itself in its further focus on partisans' perspectives on political news curation.

To the extent that the competing logics of algorithm-based (which is based on economic considerations) versus journalistic selection (which is based on considerations of socially important information) can reduce information diversity and result in serious outcomes in the political public sphere, it is important to examine partisans and politically engaged individuals' perception regarding the topic. As algorithmic personalization of news sources (particularly in social media) are popularity based and prioritize personally important content, an asymmetry in the attitudes among political partisans can result in serious outcomes. In the Literature Review that follows, I highlight research evidence that provides insights into how individuals' personal and political characteristics may affect their attitudes to different types of news selection, including algorithmic.

Literature review

Information Trust and News Curation Preference

With the rise of digital content and the escalating polarization in the US, a question of immediate concern is the quality of information coming from a variety of sources, and how much trust people place in them. Using 2015 Digital News Report from Reuters Institute, Fletcher and Park (2016) examined the role of trust in news consumption and participation in 11 countries. They found that low trust in the news is associated with preference for non-mainstream news sources, including social media, aggregators, and digital-only news sources. Tsfati and Ariely (2014) found similar patterns about the negative correlation between online news exposure and trust in news media in 44 countries from the World Values Survey.

In the 2017 Digital News Project report "Bias, Bullshit and Lies: Audience Perspectives on Low Trust in the Media" (Newman and Fletcher, 2017) in which interviews were conducted to dissect the reasons behind trust and distrust towards news media and social media, answers from the respondents indicated differing mechanisms of trust; in other words, trust and distrust are determined by different evaluations. For instance, 67% of those who do not trust the news media refers to bias, spin, and agenda. In the US, accusation of media bias is rampant with some media outlets seen as taking sides or encouraging an increasingly polarized set of opinions. Others are criticized for not calling out lies, not fully disclosing information, or creating a false equivalence of partisan opinions that are obscuring facts and understanding. Interestingly, respondents attach trust to particular news brands and criticize others who advocate opposing perspective (for example: trustors of CNN and MSNBC being critical of Fox News). Overall, trust in the news in the US often means trusting the news sources they use. Not surprisingly,

distrust in the news media is three times more likely to come from the political right than from the political left.

Despite a polarizing audience, respondents value the rigorous training and professionalism of journalism as an important factor influencing trust in the media.

Social media, however, is positively assessed for its inclusion of diverse viewpoints and authenticity. This, partly, derives from the distrust towards the mainstream media and its presumed biases and agendas. Respondents rate social media high in terms of the ability to see information from a lot of different sources to compare and triangulate information, as well as the ability to monitor what their friends and the people they like and trust are thinking.

On the other hand, despite its widespread use and increasing prominence as news intermediaries, social media is trusted less than news media due to its inability to separate fact from fiction. Respondents feel that social media algorithms promote strong and extreme opinions, or stories with sometimes inaccurate information and details. Studies indeed show a tendency of social media sharing social information without reading into the contents. For this reason, people mostly take a critical approach to information they see on social media. People who indicate some level of trust in social media seem to be those who are confident in their own ability to use and distinguish good and bad information.

Intriguingly, people associate reasons for distrusting social media with people (i.e., other social media users, journalists, or members of the public) rather than the technical "algorithmic" components of social networking sites. In fact, only 5% of the respondents explain their lack of confidence in social media in terms related to virality and algorithmic selection. In general, people do not readily talk about the technical properties of social networks, and instead focus on how other people use them to spread low-quality information. This could be linked to a

widespread lack of algorithmic awareness among the public (Eslami et al., 2015; Cotter &

Reisdorf, 2020).

      While it is not surprising that trust in news media and the functionaries of its institution

will lead to positive views of journalistic curation among the general public (Thurman et al,

2018), this assumption would not be true in a context where trust is polarized.

      With research illustrating how trust in social media and traditional media are distinctly

driven by different factors (for example, distrust in traditional media is driven by the young and

low income, trust in social media vary little in terms of key demographic variables), and how

appreciation for different methods of news curation is contingent on trust, we form the following

hypothesis and research question:

      H1. Trust in news media will be positively associated with appreciation of

journalistic political news curation, and this relationship will be stronger among Democrats

than Republicans.

      RQ1: How do trust in social media relate to appreciation of journalistic versus

algorithmic curation (including self- and peer-filtering mechanisms)?

Populist attitudes and News Curation Preference

      Populist attitudes focus on the antagonism between the people and the political elites.

      Research on the rise of populist attitudes in recent years in Western democracies has

documented a tendency of anti-media populism (Kramer, 2018), which refers to how the media

is perceived as elite institution that works against the benefits of the people among individuals

with populist attitudes (Schulz, Wirth & Muller, 2018). In particular, Schulz, Wirth & Muller

(2018) found a relationship between populist attitudes and perceptions of hostile mainstream

media. In particular, populist individuals consider their position and collective identity as "the people" in opposition to the political elite institution. This, the authors argued, is the outcome of a populist worldview working in tandem with populist messages from politicians (such as President Trump) against the mainstream media which leads to how the media is categorized as belonging to the evil elitist out-group.

Research on the relationship between populism and media variables, such as media use and media perceptions, is still underdeveloped.

Schulz (2018) analyzed news consumption patterns among individuals with populist attitudes in 11 countries found that populist citizens are more likely to consume news than non-populist citizens. However, they use less quality newspapers, less public television news, and prefer social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.

Populist citizens are also found to prefer soft news (Bos, Kruikemeier, & Vreese, 2014), entertainment, in particular tabloid press and commercial TV (Reinemann, Stanyer, & Scherr, 2016; Schulz, 2018; Fawzi, 2018). The reason for this is perhaps because these media tend to focus on and represent the people and often draw on human emotions, scandals, drama, and conflict. Selective exposure logics suspect that populist individuals will prefer sources or curation methods that are closer to their worldviews or represent ideas and beliefs that they hold.

Fawzi (2018) using a representative survey of German respondents found that anti-elite dimension of populism is consistently and negatively associated with all negative media attitudes, including media distrust and dissatisfaction with media's performance. For this reason, one can expect that populist attitudes will be positively correlated with lower appreciation of journalistic news selection. In addition, as news selected by algorithms focusing on the self's and peers' online behaviors might be perceived as common, "people like me" agenda, those with

populist attitudes might show a particular preference for this type of news selection. The

following hypotheses are formed:

H2. Populist attitudes are associated with *lower* appreciation of journalistic

curation, and *higher* appreciation of algorithmic curation.

Partisan Tendencies and News Curation Preference

Current research reveals some important findings regarding the effects of algorithms.

Empirical evidences suggest that *algorithm does contribute to political filtering, but the effect is*

weak, and people are still exposed to attitudinally opposing information. For example, Bakshy,

Messing & Adamic (2015) show that the effects of Facebook algorithm in reduced contacts with

political information from the opposing camp is present, but weaker than the effect of users

actively choosing information aligned with their position. Similarly, Flaxman, Goel, Rao (2016)

analyzed different pathways to online political news (including social media, search engines,

news aggregators, direct website visits) to show that search engines and social media introduce

people to opposing content more than direct visits.

Social media also operate under the mechanisms of "incidental exposure" ((Fletcher &

Nielsen, 2018) and "network effects" (Bechmann & Nielbo, 2018; Bode, 2016; Messing &

Westwood, 2012; Scharkow, Mangold, Stier & Breuer, 2020), which increases the algorithmic

selection of diverse content (Moeller, Trilling, Helberger, Irion, & de Vreese, 2016; Nechushtai

& Lewis, 2019). These are the potentials for an incremental increase in the heterogeneity of

information and information. As a result, extant evidences suggest low likelihood that algorithms

will lead to fragmentation in the audience, at least regarding the most important issues of public

agenda (Stark et al., 2017). Rather, under the right circumstances, these might have positive effects on opinion formation of individuals.

Despite the rise of these information intermediaries (social media, search engines), some scholars emphasized the importance of traditional media in the selection and curation of news information to the public. News supply provided by traditional media sustains a common knowledge of *socially significant* information conducive to the thriving of the public sphere, as opposed to algorithmic curation which prioritizes content of *personal significance* which might not be ideal for democratic citizens. In fact, some of the well-known undesirable effects of social media include the rise of extremist and hateful discourse, misinformation, and reinforced affective polarization (see e.g. Settle 2018).

What remains lesser known is the effects at the individual level of whether certain opinions regarding political news curation are linked to behaviors commonly documented among politically interested partisans in the US.

For example, past research examining media use correlates of opinion extremity shows that people with strong views about particular issues instead of general politics are more likely to be attentive to these issues and expose themselves to news and events related to the issues. In other words, opinion extremity is related to selective exposure. Selective exposure in turn leads to different evaluations of bias in personally selected media and general media. That is, those with extreme opinions and selective exposure tendency view the media of their choice unbiased and perceive "the media" in general to be biased. By this logic, people who have strong opinions about certain topics (such as climate change, immigration, trade), those who selectively expose themselves to congenial information, might have different beliefs about getting news curated by journalists or news based on past behavior or peers' behaviors.

Thus, the following RQ is formed:

RQ2: What is the relationship between preference for algorithmic news selection, and partisans' behaviors, such as selective exposure, opinion extremity, and likelihood to be in echo chambers?

Methods

Sample

To answer these research questions, a secondary analysis from the Quello Search Project survey data was conducted. Random samples of about 2,000 Internet users aged 18 and older from seven nations were collected in January 2017. In this study, only the US sample (n=2018) is used for the analysis. The sample was drawn from a pre-qualified panel of Internet users. The selection of respondents was done using quotas based on age, gender, and region. The resulting sample was weighted using age, gender and region so that it matched known national population proportions. The data collection was funded by Google, but Google does not have access to, or influence on this article.

Measures

Main criterion variables

The survey question at the heart of this study asked respondents to think about how political news are selected by news websites, mobile apps, and social networks. It made a distinction between political news selected by editors and journalists and news selected by computer algorithms, as well as further distinction between two forms of algorithmic selection, the so-called user tracking (automated self-filtering of news based on what the user have consumed in the past), and peer filtering (automated selection of news based on what a user's friends have consumed). The question asked respondents to say how much they agreed or

disagreed (on a 5-point scale from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree") that each of these three methods was a good way to get political news. Below is the exact wording:

Every news website, mobile app, or social media site makes decisions about what political content to show to you. These decisions can be made by editors and journalists, or by computer algorithms analyzing information about what content you have used in the past, or on the basis of what you and your friends share and interact with on social media. With this in mind, please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:

Having stories selected by EDITORS and journalists is a good way to get political news.

Having stories AUTOMATICALLY selected based on what I have looked at in the PAST is a good way to get political news.

Having stories automatically selected on the basis of what my FRIENDS have looked at is a good way to get political news.

Trust in traditional media and social media

Respondents were asked how reliable and accurate they would rate the information found in different media on a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 is totally reliable and accurate, and 1 is totally unreliable and inaccurate. Scores for newspapers, television, and radio are averaged to create an index of "Trust in traditional media", as opposed to the score for "social media".

Opinion extremity. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree with 3 statements (1: Strongly Disagree to 5: Strongly Agree): "There is a need for policy and regulation to address climate change" (climate change), "Immigration to the US should be more strictly limited" (immigration), "American would be better off with less trade with other

countries" (trade). The scores for each issue were then folded to create a new variable indicating opinion extremity (ranges from 1: no opinion to 3: extremity).

Selective exposure. is operationalized by averaging three items. The first two items asking how often the respondent has done these activities on social media (from 0: never to 3: often): 1) friended or followed someone because they SHARE their political views, 2) friended or followed someone because they offer interesting views DIFFERENT from their own (reverse-coded). The last item asks if generally speaking, the people they communicate with online tend to have different political beliefs from them, a mix of various political beliefs, or beliefs similar to theirs. Higher scores on this variable indicate a HIGHER selective exposure tendency.

Echo chamber likelihood is operationalized based on previous research (see Dubois and Blank, 2018; Dubois et al., 2020). Five following items (based on a 5-point Likert scale from *Never* to *Very often*) were averaged to create an index: The first one asks "Thinking about recent searches you have done using a search engine, how often have you discovered something that CHANGED your opinion on a political issue". The other four items have the same stem: "When looking for news or political information, how often, if ever, do you: a) read something you DISAGREE with, b) check a news source that's DIFFERENT from what you normally read, c) try to confirm political information you found by SEARCHING online for another source, d) try to confirm political information by CHECKING a major offline news medium. Higher scores on this variable indicate a LOWER tendency to be in echo chambers.

Algorithmic knowledge (following previous research e.g. Cotter & Reisdorf, 2020) is measured by the extent to which Internet users do or do not know about how algorithms work in the context of search engines, i.e. how and why certain information is prioritized in their online search results, including awareness of several factors that algorithms use to select and organize

information in search results. Respondents were asked how much INFLUENCE they think the six following factors have on the results a search engine displays to them (1: no influence to 4: strong influence): the popularity of different sites, relevance to search terms, advertising or sponsorship fees paid to the search engine, users' past search history, their geographic location, and whether a site has optimized its online visibility. Scores for these six items were averaged to create an index (Cronbach's alpha = .85).

Populist attitude is created based on averaging six items to create a populism scale. These items asked the respondents for their level of agreement with six statements (1: Strongly Disagree to 5: Strongly Agree): "Political change in this country is generally moving in the right direction", "Elected politicians should follow the will of the people", "The people, and not politicians, should participate in our most important policy decisions", "The political differences between the people running this country and the people are larger than the differences among people in this country", "Elected officials talk too much and take too little action", "What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles" (Cronbach's alpha = .66).

Age, gender, race, education, income, political interest, number of online political news sources, frequency of social media use are considered control variables.

Results

Table 1. Individual characteristics and Political News Curation Method Appreciation

	Journalistic curation		User tracking		Peer filtering	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
(Intercept)	0.40	0.346	0.44	0.344	1.16**	0.347
Age	-0.01***	0.002	-0.01**	0.002	-0.01***	0.002
Female	-0.05	0.053	-0.09#	0.053	-0.20***	0.053
White	-0.01	0.070	-0.08	0.070	-0.17*	0.071
Education	-0.03	0.036	0.01	0.036	-0.11**	0.037
Income	0.03*	0.012	-0.01	0.012	0.01	0.012
Online political news sources	0.33***	0.041	0.36***	0.041	0.45***	0.041
Frequency of social media use	-0.02	0.031	0.04	0.031	0.01	0.031
Trust - Traditional media	0.33***	0.041	0.09*	0.041	-0.02	0.041
Trust - Social media	0.16***	0.031	0.23***	0.031	0.31***	0.032
Political interest	0.03	0.037	-0.02	0.037	-0.02	0.037
Liberalism	0.07***	0.016	0.00	0.016	0.04*	0.016
OE - Climate change	0.01	0.039	-0.03	0.039	-0.13**	0.039
OE – Immigration	-0.07	0.039	-0.06	0.039	-0.05	0.039
OE - Trade	0.05	0.039	-0.01	0.039	-0.03	0.039
Algorithmic knowledge	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.05	-0.12*	0.048
Populist attitudes	0.10#	0.050	0.29***	0.050	0.29***	0.050
Adjusted R^2	0.375		0.351		0.449	

Note: Cells are unstandardized beta coefficients from ordinary least square (OLS) regression

models. OS = Opinion Extremity.

#*p* < .1; *p <. 05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 1 reports the individual correlates of the three forms of political news curation. Higher age is associated with lower appreciation of all three forms of news selection. Females, whites, and those with higher education level is less supportive of peer curation whereas higher income is associated with higher support for journalistic curation (p < .05). The more online sources individuals use, the more supportive they are of different curation methods to get political news.

It is not surprising that trust in traditional media strongly associate with journalistic curation preference; however, social media trust is associated with not only higher appreciation of algorithmic but also higher appreciation for journalistic selection. This could be because of users do not make a distinction between different ways of getting political news in social media, as news on social media can come from news organizations as well as social networks. The results do not seem to suggest that people trust news media and social media for different reasons that independently predict their preferred methods of curation.

Those with liberal ideology are more likely to support political news selected by journalists and peers compared to selection based on their past behaviors.

Out of 3 issues of interest, only strong opinions regarding climate change was found to relate to lower appreciation of peer curation.

Knowing factors that might influence algorithmic selection is significantly associated with lower level of preference for peer curation, and does not seem to have an influence on preference for users' past behaviors and journalistic selection. When *relative* preference for one type of selection over the other is the variable of interest (additional analysis in the Appendix), the role of algorithmic knowledge disappeared. This suggests that the perceived utility of political news selection is less affected by knowledge. This needs further discussion as although

users seem to perceive algorithmic selection of news to be more benevolent than editorial

process due to lack of awareness, this assessment is not accurate in reality (Thurman et al.,

2018).

There is a strong correlation between populist attitudes and two forms of algorithmic

curation, whereas it is only marginally related to journalistic curation. Additional analysis (in

Appendix) moreover shows that populist attitudes is linked with *relative* preference for

automated over journalistic news selection. This is an interesting finding that requires further

examination. Is it because people who have this assessment also have put more trust in

technology, considering technology to associate with "the people"? Or, do they prefer automated

selection because they trust its ability to curate information that is personally important and

closer to their own personal news agenda?

Table 2. Regression Predicting Preference for Algorithmic Curation (Self-selection and Peer-selection) by political ID

Variable	Democrats			Republicans		
	Self-	Peer-	Journalistic	Self-	Peer-	Journalistic
(Intercept)	-0.07	0.79	-0.37	-0.05	1.15	1.14
Age	-0.01 *	-0.01#	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.02***	-0.02***
Female	-0.16	-0.36***	-0.23*	-0.11	-0.18	-0.23*
White	-0.03	-0.18	0.11	0.24	-0.06	0.06
Education	-0.00	-0.03	0.09	-0.02	-0.13#	-0.05
Online news sources	0.29***	0.52***	0.26**	0.42***	0.45***	0.41***
Frequency of social media use	0.04	-0.06	0.01	-0.01	-0.05	-0.13#
Political interest	-0.09	0.02	0.06	-0.15#	-0.11	-0.03
Algorithmic knowledge	0.16#	-0.11	-0.02	0.16#	-0.04	0.17#
Traditional media trust	0.16#	0.06	0.30***	0.02	0.02	0.17*
Social media trust	0.17**	0.26***	0.13*	0.18**	0.31***	0.18**
Extremity (Climate)	-0.15#	-0.24**	-0.03	0.09	0.03	0.12
Extremity (Immigration)	0.01	-0.10	0.06	-0.14#	-0.03	-0.23**
Extremity (Trade)	0.03	0.04	-0.01	-0.06	-0.05	0.09
Populist attitudes	0.37***	0.40***	0.29**	0.40***	0.22*	0.18#
Selective exposure	0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.13**	0.11*	0.06
Echo chamber likelihood	0.04	-0.10	-0.09	-0.04	0.06	-0.03
Adjusted R2	0.406	0.488	0.339	0.435	0.495	0.470

Table 2 reports the relationship between political affiliation and preference for the two forms of algorithmic news selection, i.e. selection based on user's past behaviors, and peers' activities.

The purpose of this analysis is to examine the concerns regarding whether a preference for automatic news selection might expose political partisans to online tendencies often deemed as undesirable for democratic process. The "filter bubble" hypothesis suggests that news recommendation by automated agents might lead users down the rabbit hole of familiar and unchallenging information, limiting their informational and attitudinal horizon (Sunstein, 2002; Pariser, 2011). The findings, however, suggest these concerns might be overestimated. The results show that likelihood to be in online echo chambers is unrelated to opinions regarding automated news selection regardless of party identification. And that Democrats with strong opinions about climate change do not appreciate getting news based on peer and self-filtering algorithmic curation.

However, Republicans with online tendency to be exposed to similar opinions and beliefs are more likely to value automated selection of news compared to Democrats and Independents.

Appendix

Variable	Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Self-	Peer-	Self-	Peer-	Self-	Peer-
(Intercept)	-0.07	0.79	-0.05	1.15	0.46	0.52
Age	-0.01 *	-0.01#	-0.01*	-0.02***	0.00	-0.00
Female	-0.16	-0.36***	-0.11	-0.18	0.04	-0.09
White	-0.03	-0.18	0.24	-0.06	-0.13	-0.22
Education	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.13#	-0.02	-0.07
Online news sources	0.29***	0.52***	0.42***	0.45***	0.29*	0.30*
Frequency of social media use	0.04	-0.06	-0.01	-0.05	0.02	0.06
Political interest	-0.09	0.02	-0.15#	-0.11	-0.04	0.02
Algorithmic knowledge	0.16#	-0.11	0.16#	-0.04	-0.09	-0.20#
Traditional media trust	0.16#	0.06	0.02	0.02	-0.05	0.09
Social media trust	0.17**	0.26***	0.18**	0.31***	0.36***	0.37***
Extremity (Climate)	-0.15#	-0.24**	0.09	0.03	0.23*	0.16#
Extremity (Immigration)	0.01	-0.10	-0.14#	-0.03	-0.03	-0.11
Extremity (Trade)	0.03	0.04	-0.06	-0.05	-0.11	-0.18*
Populist attitudes	0.37***	0.40***	0.40***	0.22*	0.16	0.25*
Selective exposure	0.04	-0.01	0.13**	0.11*	0.03	0.03
Echo chamber likelihood	0.04	-0.10	-0.04	0.06	0.14	0.03
Adjusted R2	0.406	0.488	0.435	0.495	0.281	0.360

Regression Predicting **Relative Preference** between Editorial and Algorithmic Curation

Variable	Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
(Intercept)	0.379***		0.456***		0.465***	
Age	-0.00		-0.00		-0.00	
Female	0.01		0.003		0.002	
White	0.034**		-0.013		0.028	
Education	0.012		0.005		-0.004	
Income	0.001		0.004		0.003	
Trust - Traditional media	0.035***		0.026**		0.04***	
Trust - Social media	-0.012*		-0.004		-0.01	
Political interest	0.008		0.004		0.01	
Liberalism	0.004		0.009*		0.011*	
Online political news sources	-0.02**		-0.008		-0.006	
Frequency of social media use	-0.001		-0.010		-0.008	
R^2	11.93%		6.95%		14.09%	

Notes: Dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1 with higher value indicates preference for Editorial

over Algorithmic Curation.

Correlation Matrix of Trust in Different Information Sources

Correlation matrix

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Journalistic curation approval (1)	1														
Algorithmic curation based on personal behavior (2)	0.64	1													
Algorithmic curation based on social recommendation (3)	0.66	0.71	1												
Online political news source (4)	0.55	0.54	0.57	1											
Frequency of social media use (5)	0.17	0.21	0.21	0.30	1										
Political interest (6)	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.36	0.14	1									
Algorithmic knowledge (7)	0.26	0.26	0.17	0.39	0.24	0.21	1								
Traditional media trust (8)	0.44	0.33	0.34	0.44	0.13	0.16	0.26	1							
Social media trust (9)	0.49	0.52	0.57	0.57	0.24	0.12	0.22	0.51	1						
Extremity_Climate Change (10)	0.14	0.09	0.02	0.15	0.06	0.27	0.22	0.14	0.05	1					
Extremity_Immigration (11)	0.06	0.09	0.06	0.13	0.04	0.23	0.11	0.10	0.08	0.25	1				
Extremity_Trade (12)	0.14	0.10	0.07	0.19	0.04	0.22	0.19	0.16	0.09	0.35	0.28	1			
Populist attitudes (13)	0.28	0.35	0.33	0.38	0.11	0.30	0.21	0.21	0.28	0.19	0.34	0.23	1		
Selective exposure tendency (14)	0.11	0.13	0.09	0.15	0.14	0.22	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.08	1	
Echo chamber likelihood (15)	0.38	0.40	0.38	0.65	0.27	0.35	0.44	0.34	0.37	0.20	0.13	0.19	0.32	0.09	1

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